Paper 17
European security and defence strategy: an urgent call to action!
Findings:
Europe faces new, close and very serious threats to its security and defence, which have been neglected since the end of the Cold War.
Our entire way of life, our freedom, our democracy and our values depend on the maintenance of our security.
The price of a proactive policy to strengthen security is infinitely lower than the price of insecurity.
All NATO countries have committed to a minimum defence spending threshold of 2% of GDP (7% for Russia), but only ten Member States of the European Union reach it. The second-largest contributor in relative terms, after Poland, the United States devoted 3.49% of its GDP to defence in 2023, while preparing for uncertain elections and possibly displaying a new policy of economic isolationism and a strategy focused mainly on the Pacific.
The effectiveness of European states' defence spending suffers from cumbersome public procurement procedures and from a lack of interoperability between the predominant American equipment and the national military equipment of the large Member States (notably France and Germany), as well as that of Great Britain.
European states are excessively dependent on the American military industry: 78% of the weapons acquired by the Member States of the Union are bought from outside it, mainly from the United States. Moreover, the use by Europeans of weapons made in Europe but containing American components is, in most cases, subject to prior authorisation from Washington under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
Europe's political and industrial defence and security strategy lacks uniformity, and its funding, still very disparate at this stage, is insufficiently integrated into the Union's multiannual budget process known as the EU MFF.
Recommendations:
1. Strengthen Europe's role in NATO: Without questioning the usefulness of most of the Union's Member States taking part in NATO, it seems essential to create, within this Alliance, a credible European pillar, able to weigh more heavily and more sovereignly on decisions concerning its own security. This implies a gradual transfer of sovereign powers in security and defence to the Community institutions, through mechanisms to be defined that respect the codecision procedure and give the Commission broad executive powers.
2. Ensure implementation of the European Defence Industrial Strategy: The European Commission plan adopted in March 2024, called the “European Defence Industrial Strategy” (EDIS), should be made binding. It requires Member States to purchase at least 40% of their military equipment jointly and to choose equipment built within the Union for at least 50% of their purchases (60% in 2035).
3. Reduce dependence on American components: If Europe wants to retain real sovereignty in defence matters, it must make sure that the American components currently used in the weapons it produces are replaced by European components.
4. Improve cybersecurity and defence against hybrid warfare: Europe should also ensure complete autonomy of its defence mechanisms against hybrid warfare and cyber-attacks, coming from both outside and inside, which threaten our democracies.
5. Unify the rules on defence public procurement: The rules on public procurement in the defence sector in the various Member States should be unified and made less bureaucratic in order to favour the European arms industry. Long-term contracts must also be encouraged if industry is to invest.
6. Coordinate defence programmes: The priorities of each country and their specific skills should be identified, as well as the programmes they are prepared to take part in, and a coherent armaments policy should be defined by designating for each project a single leader responsible for coordination between all participants.
7. Broaden the sources of defence funding: The funding of defence companies could come from several sources, in particular: (1) national budgets, for the arsenals that remain significant in some states; (2) easier recourse to the EIB, which has great experience in long-term industrial financing, for private-sector companies; (3) a European defence fund, still to be set up, which could be managed by the EIB; and (4) finally, commercial banks, provided the ESG rules governing their lending activity are relaxed.
8. Reallocate existing funding: In the debate on the need for European borrowing, for increasing the Union's own resources or for raising Member States' contributions, care should first be taken to use all the available resources of the Union's other programmes that are unused or not yet indispensable.
9. Better target defence budgets: It is imperative for Europe both to define its defence and security strategy better and to quantify the budgets needed to reach the chosen objectives, in line with Member States' existing defence programmes. Better EU budgetary discipline is needed if the imperatives of economic investment, innovation and defence, which are essential to improving European competitiveness, are to be met.
10. Establish Europe's geopolitical credibility: The new European executive will have to bear in mind that, beyond its defence and security challenges, Europe must become a credible geopolitical player, which means raising its annual economic growth over the next five years from 1.7% to around 2.5%.
11. Encourage military cooperation: Ad hoc military cooperation on a voluntary basis should be encouraged, to overcome the deadlock caused by the unanimity rule. That rule should moreover be abolished in matters of common defence. It is also essential to ensure full interoperability of European military equipment and to integrate European military manufacturing capacities, as well as air traffic control systems.
12. Increase the European Rapid Reaction Force: The European rapid reaction force of 5,000 troops seems derisory to us. It should be raised to at least 50,000 and made operational before the end of 2025; decisions on its commitment and deployment should be taken by qualified majority and the relevant rules clarified. The chain of command should be carefully defined.
October 2024
